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I. Introduction: the fourth industrial revolution and the digital 
economic development1
Currently, one of  the most exciting discussions in the field of  digital technology 
field is the potential use of  AI among various social and economic processes.2 The 
concept of  Fourth Industrial Revolution encompasses the debate and one can 
understand it as describing the expansion of  automation.3 In the legal domain, there 
are several researches on the subject and the term “artificial intelligence” is been heard 
more often, not only on the specialized mass media, but also in prospective studies 
by governments.4 The International Data Corporation (IDC), a consulting firm that 
specializes in information technology in the United States, estimates that the global 
expenditures on cognitive systems and AI will annually reach around US$ 78 billion by 
2020.5 This article contributes to this debate by offering an analysis of  the European 
Union’s policies on the subject, as well as by highlighting that the issues about AI have a 
direct relation to the protection of  personal data.
The Fourth Industrial Revolution draws its power from the automation of  
production processes. However, the current stage of  automation has a new quality: 
the ability to learn from programs to improve their own performance. The traditional 
automation processes and labor is widespread in both the mass industry production 
as in the offer of  services. Several factories already deploy their products – cars, 
for example – with the intensive use of  robotic labor. The same occurs in banking 
and other services. The main difference in the automation of  the Fourth Industrial 
Revolution is the effort to create computer programs that are capable of  self-learning. 
The AlphaGo program is a usual example.6 This program won a row of  games against 
a human competitor in that old Chinese board game. The developers created a training 
routine in which the computer program played many matches against itself. Thus, 
because of  the many repetitions, it was possible to create an evolution of  its playing 
skills by the means of  an algorithmic model. Therefore, the developers of  computer 
programs in the new paradigm of  the Fourth Industrial Revolution are focusing their 
1 This article is a result from the research of  the first two authors in the scope of  cooperation between the 
Telecommunications Law Research Team of  the University of  Brasília (GETEL/UnB) and the Centre of  
Studies in European Union Law of  the University of  Minho (CEDU/UMinho). The research received 
grants from the Foundation for Research Support of  the Brazilian Federal District (FAPDF) and from 
the Jean Monnet project “INTEROP - EU Digital Single Market as a political calling: interoperability 
as the way forward”. This article was published in Portuguese as a chapter in the following book: Ana 
Frazão and Caitlin Mulholland (eds.), Inteligência artificial: ética, regulação e responsabilidade (São Paulo: Revista 
dos Tribunais / Thonson Reuters, 2019), 233-264. This article was translated by Sâmella Bonfim. It 
was presented during the Fourth France- Brazil Colloquium of  Internet Law, held at the University 
of  Brasília on 18th and 19th November of  2019. The authors also thank to FAPDF - Foundation for 
Research Support of  the Brazilian Federal District, which granted resources for the translation.
2 Klaus Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Revolution (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2016); Klaus Schwab 
and Nicolas Davis, Shaping the Fourth Industrial Revolution (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2018).
3 Jon-Arild Johannessen, Automation, innovation and economic crises: surviving the Fourth Industrial Revolution 
(London: Routledge, 2018).
4 Dietmar Harhoff, Stefan Heumann, Nicola Jentzsch and Philippe Lorenz, Outline for a German Strategy 
for Artificial Intelligence (Berlin: Think Tank für die Gesellschaft im technologischen Wandel, july. 2018); 
France, Le gouvernement, Rapport de synthèse: France intelligence artificielle (Paris: La Documentation 
Française, 2017), 36. 
5 International Data Corporation, Worldwide Spending on Cognitive and Artificial Intelligence Systems Forecast 
to Reach $77.6 Billion in 2022, According to New IDC Spending Guide (Framingham, MA: IDC, 2018), 
https://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=prUS44291818.
6 Deepmind, AlphaGo (London: DeepMind, 2019), https://deepmind.com/research/alphago. 
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building on machine learning to allow the improvement of  its skills when it comes to 
performing specialized tasks. Those new computers have a set of  skills that only apply 
to the restricted activities for which they were designed. The main point is that these 
programs would be specialized, not restricted. Soon, AlphaGo would be very effective 
for modeling and playing the game Go. By contrast, it would not have the same ability to 
model and play chess. This concept is relevant to understanding the automation of  the 
Fourth Industrial Revolution. The past machines specialized tools. The future machines 
will be super specialized.
Why is this subject, which seemingly comes out from science fiction, begun to set 
the agenda of  the economists and the governments all around the world? It does so 
because of  one simple fact. The continuous increases in profit margins of  productive 
processes are crucial for a good future of  the economic situation in the countries. Using 
highly specialized systems for agricultural, industrial or services activities will be 
imperative in order to compete in the global market. Countries that are not investing in 
these new super-specialized machines will become more dependent on those that are 
doing it. Therefore, the diagnosis of  the centrality of  these investments is becoming 
hegemonic and the issue is under debate in national and in the international fora. That is 
why the European Commission and the European Parliament draw their policies from 
Articles 4(2)(a), 26, 27, 114, 115 of  the Treaty on the Functioning of  the European 
Union (TFEU).7 They are developing specific policies for the Digital Single Market and, 
at the core of  it; they are debating a plan for development in the AI sector.8
This paper will discuss how AI – in the narrow sense – can also cause negative 
consequences for citizens and not only economic benefits. The article illustrates the 
usage of  the European Union legal framework for personal data protection – General 
Data Protection Regulation, or Regulation (EU) 2016/679,9 henceforth GDPR – to 
enable citizens to defend themselves against some AI applications. The next section will 
expose some fundamental concepts about AI.  The third section will describe the current 
documents on AI policies that are under debate in the European Union Digital Single 
Market. It will show how the subject correlates with the personal data protection issue. 
In the conclusion, the paper will describe the legal mechanisms for protecting citizens 
– based particularly on the GDPR – against fully automated decisions. The conclusion 
will be that the European Union Law is still in construction when it comes to protecting 
citizens against fully automated inferences that are unfair or unreasonable. Someone 
could consider that the Articles 21 and 22 of  the GDPR (rights of  opposition and 
explanation) would already provide enough protection. However, the definition of  the 
limits of  these legal provisions is, of  course, an ongoing regulatory process, as Sandra 
Wachter warns:
Similar concerns [algorithmic discrimination] are reflected in the RGPD, especially 
in Article 21 (Right to Opposition) and Article 22 (Rules on Individual Automated 
7 Consolidated version of  the Treaty on the Functioning of  the European Union (EU). Brussels, 
Official Journal C 326, 26 October 2012, 1-390, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
HTML/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN.
8 Max Craglia et al., Artificial intelligence: a European perspective (Luxembourg: Publications Office, 
2018), 140, https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/publication/eur-scientific-and-technical-research-reports/
artificial-intelligence-european-perspective. 
9 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  27 April 2016, concerning 
on the protection of  natural persons with regard to the processing of  personal data and on the free 
movement of  such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32016R0679&from=EN.
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Decisions, including Trimming). Article 21 introduces the right of  holders of  personal 
data to oppose data processing, including profiling, at any time. If  the purpose of  
data processing is to conduct targeted marketing, the holder will have an absolute 
right of  opposition. In all other cases, the processing of  data must be interrupted 
unless the controller can show legitimate interests to override the interests of  the data 
owners. Unfortunately, the regulatory framework does not provide a definition of  what 
would be the compelling interests of  the controllers, leaving them as well as the data 
subjects in an indeterminate legal situation. In addition to this legal uncertainty, the 
technical feasibility of  ceasing data collection is also a challenge. The ways in which 
data controllers can manage one-off  objections without ceasing all service provision 
remains unclear. As a result, users worried about their privacy – or with facilitated 
logging from Internet applications of  things – may be faced with a binary “take it 
or leave it” choice. Article 22 introduces additional safeguards against automated 
decisions, including tillering, but only when the treatment is exclusively automated and 
has legal or significantly similar effects. The scope of  applicability may be very limited, 
at least until two crucial concepts of  Article 22 (1) are still unclear, which are “solely on 
the basis of  automated processing” and “effect legal sphere or that significantly affects 
it in a similar way” (which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly 
significantly affects him or her).10
As a result, therefore, this diagnosis brings evidence about the limit of  legal 
protection. A general problem pervades the legal debate in Cyberspace since its 
beginning. It also applies to the legal framework as explained by Sandra Wachter. The 
legal regulation tends to be more efficient in repressive mode (ex post) than in preventive 
mode (ex ante). Thus, the only way to achieve efficient preventative regulation when it 
comes to fully automated decisions refers to a conjoint use of  ethical postulates and an 
increase of  the prior technical auditing capability in such automated systems.
     
II. Key concepts about AI
Before discussing the public policies proposed by the European Union, it is 
important to notice that many people use the term “artificial intelligence” usually 
without precise and accurate concepts. Meredith Broussard explains that there are two 
meanings for the same expression. In this way, she explains that there is a “general 
artificial intelligence” and a “narrow artificial intelligence”. The first concept comes 
from the common sense and from the fiction. It encompasses the kind of  artificial 
intelligence that most people think we would like to have. The second concept refers 
to the computer programs currently available and in development. It embraces the AI 
that we have available nowadays.
Alan Turing’s paper “Computer Machinery and Intelligence”, published in 1950, 
states that there is no plausible meaning to the question: “Could a machine think?”.11 
It would be too vague. He explains that the only way to satiate human understanding 
on the subject would be imagining how a machine could simulate a person. Then he 
proposes the well-known “Imitation Game”. At the same time, this paper brings other 
relevant information that needs further definition. In addition to the imitation game, 
he explains what would later be scientifically known as the Turing machine; or, the 
10 Sandra Wachter, “Normative challenges of  identification in the Internet of  things: privacy, profiling, 
discrimination, and the GDPR”, Computer Law & Security Review, No. 34 (2018): 436-449, 443.
11 Alan M Turing, “Computer machinery and intelligence”, Mind: a quarterly review in psychology and 
philosophy, v. 59, No. 236 (1950): 433-460.
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universal machine. By his diagnosis of  the 1950, it would be possible, by the end of  the 
century, to produce a machine that could win the imitation game. Consequently, the 
test is relevant for us to think that computer programmes – such as virtual assistants 
– are useful as good imitators of  human beings. It is a pertinent test for measuring 
imitation from the point of  view of  natural language. In that way, it seeks to understand 
whether a computer program can mimic a human until we can induce a person to 
believe that the actual communication is happening with another human being, rather 
than with a computer program. A periodic international competition tests imitation 
programmes. Some computer programmes already have won this test since several 
programmes already managed to deceive human counterparts. One of  them behaved 
like a schizophrenic person. Thus, when it received questions, it answered with the 
enunciation of  its “neuroses”. Another programme answered questions like a thirteen-
year-old foreigner. The Turing’s test turns out not to be an AI test.12 It is an imitation 
test of  human intelligence.
Then, the paper written by Alan Turing presents another interesting concept. It is 
the idea of  a universal machine. This machine would be a digital computer capable of  
performing any calculations. The calculations are done by introducing data through a 
tape – which became, then, customary with tapes and punch cards – that would be read 
by the machine. The machine would only read “0” (zero) or “1” (one). After reading the 
zero or one, it could consult the list of  commands – the computer programme – that 
would determine a subsequent command and then a new reading. We can understand 
the computation process like this:
Command 1 – reading space 1 – If  it is “0”, go to space 25; if  it is “1”, go to 
space 42.
Command 2 – reading space 25 – If  it is “0”, go to space 89; if  it is “1”, go to 
space 38.
Command 3 – reading space 42 – if  it is “0”, go to space 110; if  it is “1”, go to 
space 78.
These readings proceed indefinitely, until the end of  the computational process. We 
should emphasize that the binary logic – if  “yes”, do this; if  “not”, do that – is the 
basis of  all computational process. Therefore, the universal machine could execute 
any computational process. Everything would depend on the lists of  commands we 
can provide for it. Nevertheless, computation is not an intelligence process, as we can 
observe. It is a logical process and it fits perfectly in dumb machines. There is nothing 
that can be said related to intelligence as a creative or as a self-created improvement. 
The machine will do exactly as programmed and will not better itself. Certainly, Alan 
Turing knew and showed that. The main point for the definition of  intelligence, to the 
author, is the concept of  learning. Therefore, for a machine to be considered intelligent, 
it must have the capacity to learn and, then, to evolve. It is valid to transcribing a part 
of  the end of  the paper:
The idea of  a machine you learn may seem paradoxical to some readers. How 
would the machine’s operating rules change? They should fully describe how the 
machine will react whatever the future, whatever changes it may undergo. The rules 
would thus be impervious to chronological time. That’s true. The explanation for the 
paradox is that the rules to be changed in the learning process would be of  a much less 
pretentious character, considering only their ephemeral validity.
12 For an interesting overview of  the literature on the Turing test: James Moor, The Turing test: the elusive 
standard of  artificial intelligence (Berlin: Springer, 2003).
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We may hope that machines will eventually compete with men in all purely 
intellectual fields. But which ones will be the most appropriate to start? Even this is a 
difficult decision. Many people may think that a very abstract activity, like chess games, 
would be the best.13
We can label several current and actual programs as AI machines. However, we 
had better exclude those that exist just in literature or in the cinema. Those are be part 
of  the “artificial intelligence in general”, as defined by Meredith Broussard. In the real 
science and technology field, “artificial intelligence in the narrow sense”, the computer 
programs that aim to produce predictions based on large volumes of  data prevail. 
From a legal – and ethical – point of  view, the discussion is about the control of  these 
inferences and their transposition to the real application. Again, Meredith Broussard 
explains that humans create all the data and the entire computational process:
“Although data can be generated in different ways, there is one thing that all examples have in 
common: all data is generated by people. This is true for all data. Ultimately, data is always reduced 
to people counting things numerically. If  we do not think critically about it, we might imagine that the 
data springs into the world completely formed from the head of  Zeus. We assume that, because there 
are data, they must be true. The first principle of  this book: the data are socially constructed. Abandon 
any notion that data is produced by anything other than people”.14
This concept is fully compatible to the Lawrence Lessig’s explanation about 
Cyberspace and Internet regulation based on the code. The main issue is the attribution 
of  certain autonomy to processes carried out by automated systems. The automation 
generates action and interaction rules that furthermore demand high costs for their 
reformulation:
“Thus, instead of  thinking of  the “enemy of  freedom” in the abstract - as philosophers did - we 
should focus on a specific threat to the freedom that can exist at a specific time and place. And this is 
especially true when we think about freedom in cyberspace. I believe that cyberspace creates a new threat 
to freedom; absent from novelty because no theorist had conceived it before; but new in the sense of  its 
innovative emergence. We are beginning to understand a powerful new regulator in cyberspace. Such a 
regulator could be a significant threat to a wide range of  rights; and we still do not understand how best 
to control it. This regulator is what I call “code” - the instructions immersed in software or hardware 
that allow cyberspace to be what it is. This code is the “built environment” of  social life in cyberspace. 
It is their “architecture”. And if, in the mid-nineteenth century, the threat to freedom were legal norms; 
and, at the beginning of  the twentieth century, it was state power; and for much of  the middle of  
the twentieth century it was the market; so my point is that we should tend to understand how at the 
beginning of  the 21st century it is a new and different regulator - “code” - that should shape our present 
concern. However, the other relevant “regulators” should not be excluded. My argument does not mean 
that there is only a threat to freedom or that we should forget about the other traditional threats. Rather, 
it is that we must add yet another, increasingly relevant threat to the list”.15
In 1997, Joel R. Reidenberg uses the term “lex informatica” to explain the creation 
and application of  these rules in the digital environment when it comes to citizens 
and users.16 The main point for him is that one can change these “lex informatica” rules. 
13 Alan M Turing. “Computer machinery and intelligence”, 458-460.
14 Meredith Broussard, Artificial unintelligence: how computers misunderstand the world (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2018), 18.
15 Lawrence Lessig, Code: version 2.0 (New York: Basic Book, 2006), 121.
16 Joel R Reidenberg, “Lex informatica: the formulation of  information policy rules throught 
technology”, Texas Law Review, v. 76, No. 3, (1997): 553-593. The expression was also utilized by 
Aron Mefford, “Lex Informatica: Foundations of  Law on the Internet”, Indiana Journal of  Global Legal 
Studies, v. 5, No. 1, (1997): 211-237. And the creation of  the expression was made by: Willem W. Van 
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However, this modification would require the expenditure of  resources. Considering 
this allows us to place the AI regulation on another level, how could it be possible to 
modify or even suppress the application of  AI technologies – always in the narrow 
sense – that could generate damaging diagnoses for citizens? The answer is close to the 
Manuel Castells’ definition of  power, to understand the network society:
“I have gathered analytical elements necessary to address the question that is central to this book: 
where does power in global networking society radiate? To emphasize this, I must first differentiate four 
distinct forms of  power: networking power; network power; networked power; and, network-making 
power. Networking power refers to the power of  the actors and organizations included in the networks 
that constitute the core of  the global network society about the groups or people that are not integrated 
into them. This form of  power operates by inclusion/exclusion (...). In a network world, the ability to 
exercise control over others depends on two basic mechanisms: 1) the ability to build networks and to 
program/reprogram networks according to the objectives assigned to them (link and programming); and 
2) the ability to connect different networks and ensure cooperation by sharing objectives and combining 
resources while avoiding competition from other networks by establishing strategic (switching)”.17
Therefore, there are two ways of  imagining the possible regulation of  AI 
in the narrow sense. The first way refers to the regulation of  the creation and the 
modification of  computer programs. The second ways refers to the regulation of  part 
of  the raw material used by computer programs: personal data protection. The first 
way of  regulation is less likely to be effective. History is full of  cases in which there was 
an attempt to limit human creativity. Therefore, banning and limiting the creation of  
computer programmes from previous and abstract bases would be almost impossible. 
Thus, the legal regulation of  AI programming systems would tend to be innocuous. A 
derivation of  the first control modality could be the attempt to regulate the use of  
these programmes or systems. In this way, if  someone identifies a specific programme 
as a producer of  abusive results, then some authority endowed with competence to 
do so could ban its use. Of  course, this regulation will be very difficult to apply. The 
main difficulty is its kind of  ex post regulation, which means that the ban will only 
be possible after the production and identification of  damages. That is why the legal 
debate about the possible regulation of  the production of  computer programmes has 
been manifestly attached to the field of  ethics.18 Only an ethical discussion on the 
subject would allow effective ex ante regulation.
The second possible way of  regulation refers to the protection of  personal data in 
the processing systems. The attempt to build legal systems to protect citizens – in the 
European Union – dates back to the 1970s. France, for example, approved a national 
statute about this subject in 1978: Informatics and liberties act (Loi de l’informatique et 
des libertés).19 This statute already provides legal protection of  citizens against profiling, 
as well as other automated data processing. The debate in Europe about the subject, 
therefore, is much older. Therefore, the current legal provisions of  the GDPR on the 
Boom and J. H. M. Van Erp. (Sjef), “Electronic highways: on the road to liability - a case study of  the 
Internet”, in Emerging electronic highways: new challenges for politics and law, eds. Victor Bekkers, Bert-Jaap 
Kopps and Sjaak Nouwt (The Hague: Kluwer, 1995).
17 Manuel Castells, The Communication Power (Lisboa: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 2013), 80-84.
18 Brent Daniel Mittelstadt, Patrick Allo, Mariarosaria Taddeo, Sandra Wachter and Luciano Floridi, “The 
ethics of  algorithms: mapping the debate”, Big Data & Society, v. 3, No. 2 (july/december 2016): 1-21.
19 France, Loi No. 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l’informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés 
(Statude No. 78-17 of  6 January 1978, about informatics, archives and liberties). Journal Officiel 
de la République Française, January 7, 1978, 227-231, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jo_pdf.
do?id=JORFTEXT000000886460&pageCourante=00227. 
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right of  opposition and on the right of  explanation are just the evolutionary landmarks 
of  a long political and social process. In 1995, European Union Law prescribed in 
the Data Protection Directive,20 the necessity to create national legal norms to protect 
citizens in the matter. In addition, in 2001 and before the GDPR, the Charter of  
Fundamental Rights of  the European Union prescribed that the right to personal data 
protection – inserted in the Article 8.21
The two regulatory paths – ethics and data protection law – are not mutually 
exclusionary. Instead, they can converge and, thus, fortify an efficient legal regulation to 
control issues related to inferences based on statistical results, which is one of  the greatest 
challenges of  the combination between AI technologies and “Big Data”, among other 
possibilities. The next section will expose ongoing policies in the European Union for 
AI. The section will also highlight the attempts of  regulation through ethical parameters. 
     
III. The European Union policies for artificial intelligence in 
the Digital Single Market, and the Council of  Europe proposal 
 The term “artificial intelligence” describes software applications whether or not 
inscribed in hardware devices. The European Commission policy papers define the 
intelligence by the means of  self-awareness and autonomy. Nevertheless, it describes 
systems that can gather external elements and then take different decision paths.22 We 
can read the autonomy as indirectly dependent on the self-learning capability.23 AI 
applications require regulation and discussion about the ethical elements that involve 
them, because they have a certain level of  self-determination and have implications 
in many, and often sensitive, fields, such as human health, for example. It would be 
possible to think of  several regulation modes, as expressed earlier. Nonetheless, the 
regulatory tendency has been to combine self-regulation tools (ethics, for example) 
with ways of  coregulation (promotion and collaboration) and traditional regulation 
(supervision based on the protection of  personal data). The regulatory panorama, 
however, is unclear. In the intent to move toward a normative field, the European 
Union has been producing several opportunities to debate and research the issue with 
the purpose of  building policies – in the future – to regulate the subject. The current 
main objective is to search for a regulation scheme that does not harm innovation 
and creativity, which are inherent elements of  this sector. The theme achieves special 
relevance in the context of  the implementation of  the GDPR. The Brazil-European 
Union Dialogues Report of  May 2018 provides an overview of  the theme in the 
European Union. The document seeks:
“To identify trends and perspectives in the formulation of  public policies regarding the current 
and future impacts of  applications based on Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies – mainly with 
regard to the regulation of  algorithms, and their effects on guaranteeing the protection of  fundamental 
20 Directive 95/46/EC of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  24 October 1995 on the 
protection of  individuals with regard to the processing of  personal data and on the free movement of  
such data, Official Journal L 281, 23/11/1995 p. 0031 – 0050, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/
EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:31995L0046&from=en.
21 European Union Charter of  Fundamental Rights. Brussels, 18 december 2000, https://eur-lex.
europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT&from=EN.
22 European Commission, Communication from the Commission, Artificial Intelligence for Europe, 
COM(2018) 237 final, Brussels, 25.4.2018,  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
HTML/?uri=CELEX:52018DC0237&from=PT.
23 Stuart Russel and Peter Norvig, Artificial intelligence: a modern approach. 2. ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
Prentice Hall, 1995).
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rights, correction of  possible market failures and anti-competitive practices, as well as the establishment 
of  mechanisms for scientific and technological stimulation in this field”.24
This section divides its subject in two parts. The first part deals with ongoing 
policies related to the European Union. The second part will describe a proposal being 
debated in the Council of  Europe. It is always important to distinguish the Council of  
Europe from the European Union. The first is an international organization founded 
in 1949 by several European countries, which occurred right after the end of  World 
War II. Currently, it has dozens of  European countries in its composition, including the 
Russian Federation. This international organization has the European Convention for 
the Protection of  Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter, ECHR)25 
as its legal main norm and the European Court of  Human Rights (ECtHR), which 
operates in Strasbourg, as its main judicial body. The European Union is a supranational 
entity, which brings together several Member States and has a governance structure 
that operates in an integrated way for the countries that comprise it. Thus, we can label 
the ECHR as international law in the narrow sense. EU Law is an integration legal 
framework that sets a very different and complex relation between the Member States 
and the European Union itself. The justification for exposing the Council of  Europe’s 
proposal for the subject comes from the fact that all the European Union Member 
States have also joined that international organization. Moreover, Article 6 (3) of  the 
European Union Treaty prescribes that: “the Union’s law is compounded by fundamental rights, 
as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of  Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms and, as they result from the constitutional common traditions to the Member States, they shall 
constitute general principles”.26
     
a. The ongoing policies for artificial intelligence in the European Union
This subsection exposes some of  the current documents on the ongoing policies 
about AI that are under debate within the general Digital Single Market European 
Union working groups and policies. The first document is the European Parliament’s 
Resolution of  16 February 2017. This document contains recommendations to the 
European Commission on civil law provisions about robotics (2015/2103, INL). It 
proposes definitions of  “robot” and “artificial intelligence” that are flexible and do not 
create obstacles to innovation. The text considers that there has been an increase in 
investments in this area in the world – between 2010 and 2014 – and that: 
“(...) humanity lies at the threshold of  an era in which increasingly sophisticated robots, bots, 
androids and other manifestations of  artificial intelligence (AI) seem to be prepared to unleash a new 
industrial revolution, will leave no layer of  society intact, it is extremely important for the legislator to 
weigh its implications and its legal and ethical effects without hindering innovation”.27
This Resolution brings out the importance of  ethical principles for the use of  
intelligence applications in face of  the risks they could bring to “the security, the health, 
24 Paulo Novais and Pedro Miguel Freitas, Inteligência artificial e regulação de algoritmos (Brasília, Brussels: 
Governo Federal Brasileiro and European Commission, 2018), 16, http://www.sectordialogues.org/
publicacao/inteligencia-artificial-e-regulacao-de-algoritmos. 
25 Council of  Europe. European Convention on Human Rights. Strasburg, 1950, https://www.echr.
coe.int/Documents/Convention_POR.pdf.
26 Treaty on European Union (Consolidated version 2016), 7 june 2016, C 202, 18, https://eur-lex.
europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12016M/TXT&from=EN.
27 European Parliament, European Parliament resolution of  16 February 2017 with recommendations 
to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics [2015/2103(INL)], http://www.europarl.europa.
eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2017-0051_EN.html.
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the freedom, the privacy, the integrity, the dignity, the self-determination, the non-discrimination, 
and the protection of  personal data”. In that way, the document not only proposes a 
constant updating of  the legal scope of  the European Union for the subject, but it 
also advocates something that would become the Charter of  4 December 2018, of  
the European Commission for the Efficiency of  Justice (ECEJ). The influence of  
the former document on the latter comes in the form of  “an annex to the resolution, a 
framework in the form of  a consistent charter in a code of  conduct for robotics engineers, in a code for 
ethics research committees when analyzing robotics protocols and model licenses for creators and users”. 
The provisions of  the Resolution also present the importance of  AI for many fields, 
such as health, transport, education, employment and environmental impacts.
There is also a Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
of  the Regions: Artificial Intelligence for Europe, released in April 2018.28 In the 
aforementioned document, the European Commission states that the concept of  AI 
“is applied to systems which present a smart behavior, analyzing their environment and how they make 
decisions, with a certain level of  autonomy, to achieve specific objectives”. It also emphasizes that 
AI is applicable in software, such as voice assistants, image analysis programs, facial 
recognition systems, as well as in physical devices (hardware) like advanced robots, 
autonomous automobiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, or Internet of  Things applications. 
The document presents three pillars for AI, namely:
(1) Reinforce the European Union’s technological and industrial capacity and the acceptance of  
artificial intelligence throughout the economy, both by the private sector and the public;
(2) Prepare socioeconomic changes arising from artificial intelligence;
(3) Ensure an appropriate ethical and legal framework based on the values of  the Union and 
in line with the Charter of  Fundamental Rights of  the European Union.
Among the series of  proposals presented by the European Commission in the 
document, it emphasizes the importance of  strengthening the Digital Single Market. In 
this context, the document advocates the development of  uniform and adequate legal 
standards for future applications of  AI. The objective is to ensure the possibility – by 
means of  regulation – of  the free movement of  non-personal data within the European 
Union freedom area. In order to achieve this intent, legal norms are indicated, which 
will potentially strengthen online trust, such as the proposal for a regulation on respect 
for privacy and protection of  personal data in electronic communications29 and the 
Proposal for a Regulation on the “European Union Agency for Cybersecurity” and the 
certification of  information and communication technologies cybersecurity.30
A few months after the presentation of  this Communication, in December 2018, 
the European Commission published an Annex that outlines the Coordinated Plan 
28 European Commission, Communication from the Commission, Artificial Intelligence for Europe.
29 European Commission, Regulation of  the European Parliament and of  the Council concerning 
the respect for private life and the protection of  personal data in electronic communications 
and repealing Directive 2002/58/EC (Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Communications), 
COM(2017) 10 final, Brussels, 10.1.2017, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
HTML/?uri=CELEX:52017PC0010&from=PT.
30 Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology (European 
Commission), European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of  the European Parliament and of  
the Council on ENISA, the “EU Cybersecurity Agency”, and repealing Regulation (EU) 526/2013, 
and on Information and Communication Technology cybersecurity certification (‘’Cybersecurity 
Act’’), COM/2017/0477 final/2 - 2017/0225, https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-
detail/-/publication/0ae19c15-ae6f-11e7-837e-01aa75ed71a1/language-en.
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for Artificial Intelligence.31 This Plan puts AI as an element that will contribute to the 
sustainability and viability of  the industrial base of  the European Union countries. The 
Plan highlights the potential of  AI to improve services by: (1) increasing the quality and 
consistency of  services provided; (2) improving the conception and implementation of  
policy measures; (3) enabling more efficient and targeted interventions; (4) enhancing 
the efficiency and effectiveness of  public contracts; and (5) strengthening security, 
identity management, improving health services and employment. The document also 
points out that is expected that “Europe becomes the region in the global leadership of  the 
development and implementation of  cutting-edge, ethical and secure artificial intelligence, promoting a 
human-centered approach in a global context”. To this end, the Plan considers the necessity 
of  investing a few million euros in technologies geared to AI between 2018 and 2020. 
The Plan emphasizes that the projection is not only about the need for investments 
of  public funds, but also about the need to adopt partnerships with the private sector. 
The European Union’s usual role in similar issues has been to coordinate the economic 
and technological development efforts of  the Member States. In this way, the Plan 
proposes joint actions not only from the Member States; it postulates the coordination 
of  industries and academia on a common agenda for research and innovation in AI. 
Therefore, in addition to the investment directed to the industries, there is a forecast 
of  educational and research programs, with scholarships and incentives, for the 
strengthening of  excellent research centers in the field of  AI by 2020. Matthias Schäfer 
presents the roles of  each of  these actors in the proposal to build the Fourth Industrial 
Revolution within the framework of  the European Union:
“EU policy for the fourth industrial revolution should focus on strengthening the capacity of  
Member States to improve the potential for innovation in the private sector rather than on the choice of  
winners and the creation of  EU industry advocates. The private sector creates technologies that meet 
customers’ needs efficiently and effectively. The role of  governments should be to support a wide range 
of  technological applications in different sectors. Governments should be reluctant to support technology 
in which investments can be made more appropriately by companies. Removing all obstacles in the way 
of  cooperation between government and the private sector would support this approach. Universities 
would play a crucial role. They would carry the fruits of  pure science into applied science. They would 
also provide laboratories and workspaces to develop entrepreneurial skills and foster demand for new 
products, services and applications”.32
The Plan also presents relevant information that the implementation of  AI 
strategies at local level in the Member States would contribute to their growth. It states 
that by December 2018, France, Finland, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Germany 
would have already implemented AI oriented strategies. Some Member States, including 
Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Ireland and Norway, would include actions 
related to AI in a wide national digitalization strategy. In addition, Austria, Belgium, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, 
Slovakia and Spain would be in the development phase of  their national strategies.
31 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
of  the Regions. Coordinated Plan on Artificial Intelligence, COM 2018 795 final, Brussels, 7.12.2018, 
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2018/EN/COM-2018-795-F1-EN-MAIN-
PART-1.PDF. 
32 Matthias Schäfer, “The fourth industrial revolution: how the EU can lead it”, European View, v. 17, 
No. 1, (2018): 5-12, 5, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1781685818762890.
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Besides the mentioned documents, the European Commission has set up an 
Artificial Intelligence High Level Expert Group (AIHLEG).33 The Group’s overall 
objective is to support the implementation of  the European Union strategy for AI. 
This will include the elaboration of  future recommendations on the development 
of  related policies, as well as propositions on ethical and legal issues related to AI, 
including social and economic challenges.34 These guidelines cover subjects such as 
equity, security, transparency, the future of  work, democracy and, more broadly, the 
relationship between the dissemination of  these technologies and the application of  the 
Charter of  Fundamental Rights of  the European Union, including privacy, protection 
of  personal data, dignity, consumer protection and non-discrimination.
Nevertheless, the European Union has other forums and groups. The European 
Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies published a statement on March 
2018 entitled “Statement on Artificial Intelligence, Robotics and ‘Autonomous’ Systems”.35 There 
is also a public forum, engaged in a broad and open discussion of  all aspects about the 
development of  AI and its impacts: the European Alliance of  AI.36 Alliance members 
can interact with experts from the Group of  Experts AIHLEG. The various debates 
contribute directly to the elaboration of  comprehensive policies to the European 
Union in this area.
Another worth mentioning issue is the creation of  a common European data 
space since the “current expansion of  artificial intelligence is driven by the availability of  large 
datasets combined with increases in processing capacity and connectivity”. This excerpt is contained 
in the aforementioned Communication of  the European Commission about AI.37 
Based on it, it is possible to visualize the evident overlapping of  policies in favor of  
AI with data protection. Thus, the debate of  the topic of  AI relates to the discussion 
on the application of  the GDPR. This is because the European Union organizes 
its initiatives towards the Digital Single Market in an integrated way. In that sense, 
all the efforts of  multiple instances of  the European Union are engaged in drawing 
principles and converging guidelines. In this way, in the 537th European Economic 
and Social Committee of  September 2018, an Opinion was stated about “Artificial 
intelligence: anticipating its impact on work to ensure a fair transition” (own-initiative opinion) 
(2018 / C 440/01). This Opinion contains recommendations that revolve around the 
strengthening of  ethical principles in the elaboration of  new technologies based on AI 
and their strengthening in the productive and labor environment, such as:
 “(…) recommends that engineers and intelligent machine builders be trained in the field of  ethics 
in order to avoid the emergence of  new forms of  digital taylorism in which the human being is relegated 
to the execution of  machine instructions. The dissemination of  good practices and the partition of  
experience in this field should be promoted”.38
33 “Digital Single Market policy: High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence”, last modified July 
3, 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/high-level-expert-group-artificial-intelligence. 
34 High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, Draft ethics guidelines for trustworthy AI (Brussels: 
European Commission, 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/draft-ethics-
guidelines-trustworthy-ai.
35 European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies, Statement on Artificial Intelligence, 
Robotics and “Autonomous” Systems (Brussels: European Commission, 2018), http://ec.europa.eu/
research/ege/pdf/ege_ai_statement_2018.pdf.
36 “Single Market policy: the European AI Alliance”, last modified August 21, 2019, https://ec.europa.
eu/digital-single-market/en/european-ai-alliance. 
37 European Commission, Coordinated Plan on Artificial Intelligence, COM 2018 795 final. 
38 Opinion of  the European Economic and Social Committee on “Artificial intelligence: anticipating its 
impact on work to ensure a just transition” (own-initiative opinion), 2018/C440/01, OJ C 440, 6.12.2018, 
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The Opinion also addresses another topic of  great relevance when it comes to AI 
and employment. The liability for damages:
“The Industrial robots or service robots collaborate more and more with the human being. 
Artificial intelligence allows robots to “get out of  their cages”, what can cause accidents. As such, the 
liability of  autonomous systems if  an accident occurs must be clearly established and the health and 
safety risks to which workers are susceptible must be covered. The European Commission is launching 
a reflection on these emerging risks within the chart of  the Directive when it comes to the responsibility 
due to the products. This approach should be more ambitious with regard to safety at work”.
Therefore, it is possible to see a synergy between specific policy themes – such 
as AI and the Internet of  Things – and the debates that are occurring within the 
European Union about the protection of  personal data.  The same meeting of  the 
European Economic and Social Committee, which produced the Opinion about AI, 
adopted another Opinion about “Trust, privacy and safety for consumers and companies on 
Internet of  Things”.39 Those courses of  actions come in a comprehensive project. They 
reflect the necessary uniformity needed for data subjects in the Digital Single Market 
and its expansion in several strands. After that description of  this set of  actions in the 
context of  the European Union, we should describe the proposal of  the Council of  
Europe about AI in judicial systems.
b. The Council of Europe proposal about ethics to the artificial intelligence in 
the judicial systems
The proposal refers to the ethical principles related to the use of  AI in judicial 
systems, published on 4 December 201840 and was adopted by the European 
Commission for the Efficiency of  Justice (ECEJ), operating within the framework of  
the Council of  Europe. The ECEJ brings together experts from the 47 Member States 
of  the Council of  Europe and tries to improve the quality and efficiency of  European 
judicial systems as well as to strengthen the confidence of  court users in such systems. 
The document that approves the proposal is the “European Ethical Charter on the Use of  
Artificial Intelligence in Judicial Systems and their environment”. The Charter is directed towards 
the stakeholders – public or private –, who are responsible for designing or applying AI 
tools and services related to the processing of  court rulings and judicial data (whether 
by machine learning or by any other method derived from data science). In addition, 
the Charter is addressed to those responsible for establishing a legal framework on the 
national level. It lists five principles: (i) principle of  respect for fundamental rights; (ii) 
principle of  non-discrimination; (iii) principle of  quality and security; (iv) principle of  
transparency, impartiality and fairness; and, (v) under user control principle.
When it comes to processing judicial data and decisions, the judicial-related 
systems must use certified sources and data developed in multidisciplinary models, in a 
safe technological environment. Another concern about the use of  AI is the necessary 
special care when processing directly or indirectly “sensitive” data. This data may 
include a wide range of  elements. They might refer to a possible racial or ethnic origin, 
as well as socio-economic background, political opinions, religious or philosophical 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/PT/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2018:440:FULL&from=EN, 
5-12.
39 Opinion of  the European Economic and Social Committee on “Artificial intelligence: anticipating 
its impact on work to ensure a just transition” (own-initiative opinion), 2018/C440/01. 
40 European Commission for the Efficiency of  Justice (CEPEJ), European Ethical Charter on the 
Use of  Artificial Intelligence in Judicial Systems and their environment (Brussels: Council of  Europe, 
2019), https://rm.coe.int/ethical-charter-en-for-publication-4-december-2018/16808f699c.
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beliefs, trade union membership, genetic, biometric data or health-related data or data 
related to sexual aspects or sexual orientation. The Charter states that, when someone 
identifies potentially discriminatory data, some remedial measures must come into 
force to limit or, if  it is possible, to counteract such risks and to raise awareness 
among the ones involved. The main objective is to create safeguards in order to avoid 
discrimination, in accordance with the guarantees to a fair trial.
After the principles, the Charter has four Appendices. The first – and largest – is 
entitled “In-depth study on the use of  AI in judicial systems, notably AI applications 
processing judicial decisions and data”. Different European countries researchers 
author this appendix. It brings many examples of  good and bad uses of  AI in judicial 
systems. In brief, to the ECEJ, the application of  AI in the field of  justice can contribute 
to improving the efficiency and quality of  the public service. Nevertheless, these 
new technologies must be applied in a responsible manner, respecting fundamental 
rights, in particular those assured in the European Convention on Human Rights,41 
as well as the ones assured in the Convention 108+ (Convention for the protection 
of  individuals with regard to the processing of  personal data).42 This initiative of  the 
Council of  Europe is an example on how it is possible to fulfil a desired correlation 
between human rights protection, personal data protection, and protection against new 
and potentially harmful technologies. AI remains at the crucible of  all these protection 
policies and they can receive legal force from the Council of  Europe’s ECtHR. As 
a matter of  fact, that legal and institutional framework can be an example for other 
countries and regions.
IV. Conclusion: the idea of  the right to fair and reasonable 
inferences
The increase in capacity of  processing information– and its cost reduction – 
was a crucial step in the development of  computer programmes capable of  analyzing 
a very large amount of  data. The cost reduction was useful for making technology 
more accessible for the automation of  decision-making in courts. In the 1970s, when 
France passed the Informatics and liberties act (Loi de l’informatique et des libertés) into 
law, there were few devices capable of  producing high-performance computing, which 
is a necessary condition for creating massive potential damages. Nowadays, the facts 
are entirely different. In the past, the production of  information for further processing 
was very complicated. Nowadays, data gathering methods have also become more 
accessible. We can characterize Big Data by the use of  a large volume of  data, in great 
variety, through a high-speed data processing system. This data processing is capable 
of  generating information that would not be intuitively available. It can also provide 
dense information to justify complex and risky decisions, such as granting a bank loan 
or hiring people to perform specialized services. The joining of  Big Data with AI refers 
to the possibility of  creating computer programs that can learn from errors that they 
make when performing data processing in order to provide useful information. The 
system will improve in their capacity to offer prodigious data processing.
41 Council of  Europe, European Convention on Human Rights, Strasburg, 1950, https://www.echr.
coe.int/Documents/Convention_POR.pdf.
42 Convention 108+: Convention for the protection of  individuals with regard to the processing 
of  personal data. Strasburg, Conciul of  Europe, June 2018, 33, https://rm.coe.int/convention-108-
convention-for-the-protection-of-individuals-with-regar/16808b36f1.
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This article demonstrates the attempt to construct legal frameworks – whether 
in the European Union, National Law or International Law – in order to provide 
protection for citizens against the result of  fully automated decisions. The French 
statute, at some sense, foresaw the right of  explanation and opposition of  the GDPR 
under its 1st to 5th Articles.43 Under European Union Law, the Directive 95/46/CE also 
provided protection provisions – the right of  explanation and opposition – against 
automated decisions in its Articles 14 and 15. In addition, the Directive explains the 
special protective needs in its Recitals 15, 27 and 41. The GDPR overcame the Directive 
but it continues to list the rights of  explanation and opposition in its Articles 21 and 
22. It also mentions the issue in Recitals 15, 35 and 71. The GDPR also reinforces the 
need to comply the Conventions 108 and 108+ of  the Council of  Europe. Lastly, it 
reinforces Article 8 of  the Charter of  Fundamental Rights of  the European Union, 
which provides the right of  personal data protection.
One may think that the legal framework is complete. On the other hand, is it not? 
For Sandra Wachter and Brent Mittelstadt, researchers at the Oxford Internet Institute 
of  Oxford University and at the Alan Turing Institute of  the British Library, the 
answer would be negative. They postulate the need to construct a right to reasonable 
inferences.44 The first step to analyze the subject would be to determine whether the 
inferences – results produced from possible data processing – could receive protection 
from the GDPR. They examine this subject through the point of  view of  an amalgamate 
array of  rights: the right of  access, the right of  information, the right of  rectification, 
the right of  erasure, the right of  opposition and the right of  explanation. In the paper, 
they test the applicability of  the GDPR provisions with regard to the interpretation of  
pragmatic cases judged by the Court of  Justice of  the European Union (Hereinafter, 
CJEU)45 and by the ECtHR46 as well as by the definition model of  personal data,47 
produced by the Data Protection Working Party Article 29.48 
Their conclusion is that there must be an expansion of  the legal protection based 
on a jurisprudential innovation by the CJEU. At the end of  the article, they expose 
five recommendations. The first one is to expand the concept of  protection beyond 
personal data. They emphasize that personal data compound the right of  privacy, which 
would include the right to identity, reputation, self-image and autonomy.49 The second 
43 France, Loi No. 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l’informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés, 227-231.
44 Sandra Wachter and Mittelstadt, “A right to reasonable inferences: re-thinking data protection law in 
the age of  Big Data and AI”, Columbia Business Law Review (2019). 
45 Court of  Justice (Second Section), Peter Nowak contra Data Protection Commissioner, 20 december 2017, 
C-434/16,https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/PT/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:62016CJ0434. 
Court of  Justice (Third Section), YS contra Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel, 17 july 2014, C-141/12 
and C-372/12, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/PT/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:62012CJ0141. 
Court of  Justice (Main Section), Comissão Europeia contra The Bavarian Lager Co. Ltd., 29 june 2010, C-28/08 
P, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/PT/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:62008CJ0028. The paper 
also appreciates other judgments; however, these are the paradigms we selected as the most relevant.
46 Directorate General Human Rights and Rule of  Law, Case Law of  the European Court of  Human Rights 
concerning the protection of  personal data (Strasburg: Council of  Europe, june 2018), https://rm.coe.int/t-
pd-2018-15-case-law-on-data-protection-may2018-en/16808b2d36. 
47 According to the report in question and with the authors: “the content, purpose and outcome of  
the data (treatment) must relate to an identifiable person, either directly or indirectly. Ibidem, p. 15-16.
48 European Commission, Article 29 Data Protection Working Party. Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of  Personal 
Data (01248/07/EN WP 136) (Brussels, Belgium: Directorate C (Civil Justice, Rights and Citizenship) 
of  the European Commission, Directorate General Justice, Freedom and Security, june 2007), https://
ec.europa.eu/justice/Article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2007/wp136_en.pdf.
49 Sandra Wachter and Mittelstadt, “A right to reasonable inferences”, 81.
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recommendation would be that the protective means should – based on the GDPR 
– focus more on the process of  analyzing the personal data than on the methods 
of  collection. The GDPR system defines categories of  personal data to set different 
levels of  protection. However, the authors consider, taking into account the Opinion 
of  the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, that that should be a categorization 
of  protection based on the objectives and impact of  the data processing. The third 
recommendation seems to be a logical consequence of  the second one. They state 
that there should be an evaluation of  risks not only on personal data, which gains its 
definition from the direct relationship it has with the holder of  that data. Alternatively, 
there should be an evaluation of  the data processing in a wider range. According to 
the authors, profiling from databases made anonymous may also create risks for the 
data subjects in data processing. In a certain way, the authors affirm the extension 
of  personal data protection to cases in which it would not be possible to identify the 
holders. It would be possible to describe the proposal as a protection of  the diffuse 
rights regarding personal data, which at first may sound contradictory. The fourth 
recommendation would be to expand the technical protection of  the data processing, 
requiring a prior analysis of  potential data sources before proceeding with large-scale 
analyses. This suggestion intends to cover even new data sources, such as mouse 
movements on computer screens.50 The GDPR has already provided previous risks 
evaluations (impacts assessments) in Articles 35 and 36. This suggestion relates to the 
procedural and substantive coherence that is determined by the GDPR in Articles 
63 and 64. The national data protection authorities, in line with the European Data 
Protection Board, must carry out these tasks.
Finally, the last recommendation refers to the legal construction of  the right to 
oppose unreasonable inferences. Their idea is to create a right from a legal interpretation 
of  the other data protection rights already inscribed in the GDPR. However, the 
authors themselves are aware of  the limits of  this proposal:
“The intention to recognize the ex-post right to challenge unreasonable inferences is not, however, 
a guarantee that the data controller should modify his inference or assessment from the claim of  a holder 
of  personal data. Rather, it aims to establish a dialogue between data controllers and incumbents in 
which the former share details and justifications for the proposed inferential treatment, which will be 
open to comments and questions by the latter, under the terms of  Article 22 (3) of  the RGPD. This 
will be positive for both parties, just as an accurate assessment is taking place in the interests of  all”.51
As Sandra Wachter and Brent Mittelstadt know the limits of  protection in the 
cyberspace and in the Internet have always been related to a structural dilemma, 
diagnosed by the first researches who dealt on the subject: the legal protection is 
applicable ex post, whereas the technical rules – fixed by the programs and network 
architecture – are applicable ex ante. As indicated in the text, the concepts of  Code 
(Lawrence Lessig) and Lex Informatica (Joel R. Reidenberg and others) are enough 
to highlight the problem. The solution exposed by these two authors consist of  a 
construction of  legal, economic, social or ethical mechanisms, which can influence the 
production of  computer programs and standards tuned with a progressive paradigm 
in a matter of  rights. The solution is, therefore, indirectly legal. However, it will be 
directly technical or ethical. Their long-time conclusion enlightens the importance 
50 Fast Company, “Facebook confirms it tracks your mouse movement on the screen”, 13 june 2018. 
https://www.fastcompany.com/40584539/facebook-confirms-it-tracks-your-mouse-movements-
on-the-screen. 
51 Sandra Wachter and Mittelstadt, “A right to reasonable inferences”, 84-85.
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of  the fora – such as those created within the European Union – and the political 
decisions – such as the ones taken by the European Parliament and the Council of  
Europe. They are effective actions to consolidate an ethical paradigm and a positive 
influence in the establishment of  technical rules tuned with respect of  the rights of  
the citizens paradigm. Many years ago, François Ost and Michel van de Kerchove had 
already diagnosed the emergence of  new legal sources that showed the emergence of  
a new type of  legal system. The traditional concept of  a legal system – hierarchical, 
linear and arborescent – no longer serves to understand the complex construction of  
the contemporary law:
“The collapse of  the network pyramid is an evolution that is accompanied by two other major 
transformations of  the juridical-political universe: the transition from regulation to regulation and the 
potential escalation of  the governance in place of  government (gouvernement). Network, regulation 
and governance thus form a new device by which it will undoubtedly be excessive to say that it replaces 
the classical triad-regulation-government pyramid; however, such a dawning is certain and subverts the 
modes of  operation. A few words, especially, about regulation, by which we can say that it has come to 
be the new mode of  production of  the right, of  means to the right in network. The unilateral command 
of  authority, centralized - sovereign, in a word - gives way to a multipolar, decentralized, adaptive and 
subsequently negotiated order. The concept of  regulation seems to be able to adequately account for this 
context. Regulating, it could be said, is for normative production, just as the treatment of  texts is for 
the production of  information: a flexible and evolving mode of  management of  an indefinite set of  data 
in the search for an at least provisional balance”.52
It is possible to conclude that the Articles 21 and 22 of  the GDPR have limitations 
and that they should be subject to a future evolution of  data protection law, in dialogue 
with ethical and technical debates. However, it is necessary to emphasize that the 
problem is even deeper: how can learning algorithms avoid perpetuating discrimination 
– unjust and unreasonable inferences – underlying the data from which they learn and 
develop? Law itself  cannot solve such a problem. We can clearly see the need for a 
“multipolar, decentralized, adaptive and negotiated ordination”, as pointed out by François Ost 
and Michel van de Kerchove. In this way, as exposed by Felipe Debasa, it was necessary, 
in the past, to comprehend the study of  law as a scientific discipline; nowadays, in 
contrast, it is imperative to analyze it also as a tool.53 In addition, according to him, we 
can consider the European Union as a great laboratory to visualize the construction of  
a new legal and regulatory regime to provide protection to citizens in terms of  this new 
information age.54 The European Union legal system represents, to a certain extent, a 
clear example of  network integration law, once its protective standards come from a 
complex dialogue between the national jurisdictions within the Union and international 
bodies, such as the Council of  Europe.
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